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HOW TO REDUCE YOUR FIRE INSURANCE RATES
To correct any mistaken impressions that could result from the title of my
address, I should make it clear that I am not an insurance rate technician. We
have rating technicians who devote their entire time to the principles and applica-
tions of rating schedules and individual risk rate make-ups. My own involvement is
limited to the broad general principles and overall results of the detailed rating
system in our various property and casualty lines.
I might also remind you that insurance companies are in business to make money,
although the level of profit we seek is modest. Nevertheless, we do have a profit—
as well as a public service—motive, just as those of you who are in the construction
trades or who are building and plant owners.
Fire insurance premiums are essentially the product of losses plus the necessary
expenses of the insurance company to do business. In any major rating classification,
the class itself establishes its own rates over long experience periods. I emphasize
that the rating system recognizes long experience periods because in high-valued
properties, a large single loss can distort the short-term averages. Of course an
individual loss would not, in itself, have sufficient credibility for ratemaking
purposes. /
The important thing is that if losses go up, insurance rates are going to have
to go up. So the simplest way to reduce your fire insurance rates is to reduce your
fire insurance losses, and to get others to do likewise.
S'
With that primer in ratemaking, let's take a closer look at how the insurance
underwriter looks at property insurance.
Historically, the attitude of underwriters toward buildings of fire resistive
construction has been quite favorable and the underwriting treatment accorded them
quite liberal. Until recent years, most underwriters would not hesitate to freely
commit their full capacity on fire resistive structures, subject to minimal inspec-
tion requirements.
The practices in the building trade were generally toward heavy masonry construc-
tion, the combustibility load of such things as high-rise office buildings was light
and, generally, good fire cut-off standards were followed between floors. Consequently,
subject to underwriting of the occupancy plus an assurance that any special hazards
were adequately recognized and cared for, this was considered very desirable business.
The loss experience was good and the rates reflected this until they reached almost
minimal levels.
Today, things are different. During the past few years, we have seen some
drastic changes in construction methods and materials. We are now seeing an increasing
number of multi-million dollar fires in so-called fire resistive buildings occurring
out of these changes in construction and materials.
Since the'end of World War II, our booming economy has created a huge demand for
more and better office, plant and storage space. Many new, attractive materials have
been appearing on the market with resultant changes in building methods in order to
utilize them. Sky-rocketing labor costs have resulted in the development of labor-
saving construction techniques.
The financial squeeze put on municipal governments dictated a broader tax base,
so it became politically expedient to allow building code variances in order to speed
/
up development of commercial properties. In some major cities building codes have
been completely revised, and not always for the better,.
This combination of experimental designs, untried materials and relaxed code
requirements has given us many buildings which no longer have the same high degree
of fire resistance we once knew and which, in many cases, do not provide adequate
life safety for occupants. /
Let me give you two examples of the new type fire losses we are experiencing in
many so-called fire resistive buildings. .
A typical, modern 50 story skyscraper in New York was completed in early 1970.
The building has a reinforced concrete center core which contains the elevator
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shafts, stair towers, rest rooms, utilities and air conditioning supply and return
air shafts. Steel girders connect this core to columns at the outside wall of the
building so that the floors are column-free except at the east and west sections.
Beams support the 2-1/2" thick concrete floor on fluted floor form units and
are joined to the concrete floors by steel studs. Columns, girders, beams, and the
underside of floors are protected by sprayed asbestos fibre to provide a four hour
fire resistance for columns and three hour rating for filler beams and floors.
Walls are made up of aluminum panel window sections which also encase the
outside columns. There is a 6" concrete block curtain wall 28" high built:on the
outer edge of the floor slab. This wall is located in line with the center of the
wall columns so that the outer skin is 16" out from this wall. This separation
creates vertical flues the height of the base o'r tower which is 143' maximum, which
are interrupted at each floor level by an aluminum metal flashing designed to collect
condensation and carry it through weep holes to the outside.
The inside face of the curtain wall, the space between the windows, and the
\
space above the windows is insulated with 1" Dorvon FR 100 Polystyrene foam board.
This insulation is covered on the inside by gypsum board only where visible. There
is no covering on it above the hung ceiling. As a result, the protection between
/ : '
the concealed ceiling spaces of two floors consists of two 1" thick pieces of foamed
polystyrene and a thin sheet of aluminum.,
The concealed space between the hung, ceiling and the floor above contains air
supply ducts, lighting fixtures, power lines and conduit, telephone cables and
communication cables. .
During the application of finishing touches for occupancy of luxurious offices
by a new tenant, on the 31st, 32nd, and 33rd floors, a guard on the 33rd floor saw
smoke above the ceiling through an opening and reportedly pulled the fire alarm box
on his floor. He then took the elevator to the first floor to notify the building
guards of the fire. . *"'""
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two guards and a telephone installer supervisor took the elevator to the 39th
floor to notify other employees of the fire. Their elevator stopped at the 33rd
floor, and smoke and flames rushed in. The elevator would not move from the floor
with the result that the two guards perished and the telephone foreman was barely
alive when rescued by firemen two hours later.
The Fire Department responded within three minutes from the time the alarm was
received, but. when they arrived, the 33rd and 34th floors were raging infernos with
so much smoke and heat that the firemen could only operate on the floor for a short
time.
It was five hours before the fire was brought under control and in those five
hours, two lives were lost, 30 men were injured and damage totaled ten million dollars.
The 33rd, 34th, and 35th floors were burned out, with varying degrees of smoke
and heat damage to many additional floors above and below. .The fire spread to the
exposed polystyrene foam in the south and east walls and emerged from the concealed
space in the form of flaming droplets of flaming gases.
As the heat involved furniture stuffed with feather or foamed polyurethane, its
progress accelerated because of the amount of combustibles and flammable gases given
off. Tests made' after the fire showed that the polyurethane foam gave off flammable
gases at 212°F.
I would like to read to you excerpts from the official investigation report of
this fire by the New York Board of Fire Underwriters.
"The reason for the severe fire in this fire resistive building can be understood
if it is realized that the building classification is a misnomer. Buildings of this
type erected in this plastic age should more correctly be called 'semi-combustible.'
;
Except for the concrete and metal, almost everything in the building is combustible
to some degree - foam plastic wall insulation, electrical cables, ceiling tiles,
partitions and insulation on air handling units. The degree in some cases is small
but added to the severe fire hazard caused by foamed plastic furniture, there is the
recipe for this conflagration.
"The degree of damage to the steel frame is the result of several factors.
It is reported that this steel came from England and became severely oxidized in
transit. As a result, the sprayed asbestos fibre did not adhere well in many places
and fell off along with the scale shortly after application. As a second factor,
this insulation was removed in many locations where partitions were run to the
underside of beams, where air ducts ran under beams, where clamps are attached,
where wires scrape it. The situation that exists in a laboratory when this material
is tested is not the same situation that exists in the field."
That last point is important. Time and time again we have blindly and in good
faith accepted laboratory tests of the fire resistance of new materials, only to have
the materials not prove out when it really counted. Well, I think underwriters-tfiive
been burned once too often. We are going to be taking a much more critical look at
both the design and materials characteristics of new construction, and we are going
to be much more cautious in accepting and rating risks. The report I just referred
to puts it this way:
"This fire has provided a major full scale test for new methods of construction.
The transmission of fires between floors, the distribution of smoke throughout the
building and the failure of structural elements prove the necessity of reviewing the
present requirements and practices.
"Since this building is typical of a large number of buildings now being built,
recommendations are being made on a general basis rather than applying specifically
to this building."
The report lists 14 recommendations which I will not read now because of their
length. I do have two or three copies which you may pass around, however, and
additional copies may be obtained by writing to me at Fireman's Fund American
Insurance Companies in San Francisco. i . ' ••. •
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The second example involves a building in California in the course of construc-
tion. The structure had a total floor area of approximately 332,000 square feet.
This was a one equals two story building of 6 inch reinforced concrete tilt-up walls
i
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with reinforced concrete pilasters which were to have been divided into four fire
divisions separated by 6 inch reinforced concrete fire walls with fire doors and
dampers covering openings. The floor was concrete and the roof was composition
on wood decking on wood truss. '
The building was to be for a fruit processing and cold storage operation. The
entire east side of the building was divided into cold storage and cooler rooms
constructed of half-inch plywood on 2 X 4 wood stud framing extending from floor
to roof, with pplyurethane foam insulation sprayed on all walls and dividers and on
the underside of both the equipment decks and the roof.
At the time of the fire, the building was almost complete, with one section
occupied and cut off from the other three sections. The three sections not yet
occupied were not separated from each other in that the fire doors were not in
operation.
The fire was caused by a welder's torch while sweating a water pipe to cooling
equipment, igniting polyurethane foam insulation in the area of the cold storage
rooms. The polyurethane foam insulation, while a good insulating agent, was of such
high combustibility characteristics that the entire three uncompleted sections of the
building were totally engulfed in flames within approximately nine minutes from the
/
time the fire started.
Several workmen on scaffolding at the opposite end of the building from which
the fire originated were barely able to escape in time to avoid injury. The three
sections of the building which were still not occupied were practically a total loss.
The ultimate loss was in excess of $4,000,000 on a building with a cost of $5,500.000.
Unfortunately, these two examples do not represent uncommon losses. A look at
statistics for recent years reveals an ominous trend: a $15,000,000 grocery warehouse
fire in Boston; a $3,000,000 fire at a school under construction in New Hampshire- -
and so the list continues.
The result of this can only be substantially increased fire and liability
insurance rates, because of the exposure to life and property. It is not surprising
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that many insurance companies—including my own—are taking a closer look at the
so-called fire resistive buildings which we have considered superior risks eligible
for premium discounts under commercial package policies.
Instead of giving discounts, we may be asking for surcharges on some of these
buildings, particularly until we are satisfied that the lag in rate making has caught
up to the new loss trend. Indeed, in some-cases, I would not be surprised to see
available-insurance capacity become an acute problem in some hazardous type construc-
tion unless .there is considerable improvement in construction methods.
But the picture is not so bleak as it might seem. Rates can be reduced, and
the key to reducing them lies in incorporating-'.the many existing fire protection
methods into the initial stages of building planning, with diligent follow-through
in the construction phases. It is then that fire protection is least expensive and
most effective—not when it is thrown in as an ill-planned afterthought.
I would call upon you to exercise your leadership in making fire protection an
integral part of building design and construction, both through your own expertise
and with the help of qualified engineering personnel readily available to assess the
weaknesses and strengths of design. Most major insurance companies have experts
•H"
ready to assist and advise in connection with proposed construction plans, and Fire
Rating Bureaus in practically all jurisdictions have experts who will respond, upon
request, in connection with building design and construction.
A prime example of the benefits to be. reaped from advance planning is a recent
fire at the University of California at Santa Cruz. Although losses totaled
$150,000, fire prevention experts revealed' that losses could have been substantially
reduced if the building had been sprinklered—at a cost of $6,000.
A second method of reducing fire insurance rates is, of course, reduction of
loss potential in existing structures. Essential to the success of any such program
is installation and maintenance of adequate fire protection systems, combined with




Equally essential is a periodic inspection of the premisesl, followed by
correction of hazardous conditions—in other words, good housekeeping. Most impor-
tant of all, perhaps, is proper use of the facility--a building should not be used
for a purpose more hazardous than its design and construction permit.
Again, both insurance companies and Fire Rating Bureaus stand ready to provide
assistance--and I would urge you to take advantage of the advice.
In view of the location of this conference and because I am sure many of you
are from California and other West Coast areas, I would remiss if I did not mention
the fire hazard in the aftermath of earthquakes. The danger is a very real one, as
evidenced by such tragedies as the San Francisco disaster of 1906, but present
building standards seem destined to increase, rather t;han reduce, the exposure from
earthquakes.
We were very surprised to learn of the collapse or failure of several recently
constructed modern buildings in both the Santa Rosa earthquake in 1969 and the San
Fernando Valley quake which just occurred in February of this year. The distressing
part is that investigation by eminently qualified engineers following the failure
and collapse of some of these buildings clearly indicated they should not have been
a surprise.
I would like' to quote from page 58 of a study released by the United States
Department of Commerce on the Santa Rosa, California earthquake of October 1, 1969.
"Research on materials has led to their more effective use in buildings, but
not without side effects. Sprayed-on fireproofing around steel frames in lieu of
poured-in-place concrete fireproofing has greatly reduced the inherent lateral force
resistance of many structures, since the mathematically neglected concrete with the
steel frame members formed, in effect, composite members.
"Research on concrete,members has changed design practice to the extent that
allowable unit-design stresses have increased as much as fivefold in recent years,
creating new design problems such as overturning, multiple types of stress, concen-
tration, and concrete splitting. Metal and glass skin exteriors have replaced •
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brick and concrete panel walls, thereby reducing inherent strength and damping.
Many other examples can be cited.
"The net effect of all of these developments has been to substantially reduce
the inherent lateral force resistance of buildings, unless the designer included
• •*
noncode-required bracing. This extra bracing is too often opposed on the basis of
costs or a lack of understanding.
"In essence then, a designer who follows the letter of the law as expressed in
the building code, but lack experience judgement when extrapolating code values to
new types of structures, can inadvertently design a collapse-hazard structure which
is legally safe. Collapse is more probable today than it was several decades ago,
before changed practice had reduced a structure's uncounted strengths."
Thus, it is possible for a planned building to be considered legally safe, while
it is, in reality, a collapse-hazard structure. Equally disturbing is the fact that
code requirements have so changed within recent years that a framed concrete building
today is permitted to have about half the lateral force resistance—earthquake
bracing, if you will—than 'that required ten years ago.
On top of all this, we understand that the International Conference of Building
Officials, publishers of the uniform building code, now has before it a proposal to
further reduce the safety factor on concrete construction.
Gentlemen, as underwriters, we are concerned. I must tell you in all candor
that it is not a function of insurance to insure deficiency in design or construc-
tion method.
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